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Abstract 
We have witnessed in the West over the last forty years or so, a rampant increase in the number 
and severity of penal sanctions. This has been driven, it has been suggested, by a broadening and 
an intensification of punitive sentiments or punitiveness (Pratt, 2011)). We may take it that what 
characterizes punitiveness is the desire to punish, however, this idea runs up against serious 
problems if we don’t know what punishment is, hence in part one of this paper I examine what 
punishment is taken to be, and what it is taken to be for. I suggest that the only claim about the 
nature of punishment that really holds water is that it involves the infliction of pain, and 
punitiveness therefore becomes the desire to inflict pain. Revealing as this does that punishment 
is not necessarily to be equated with the settling of legal harms, in part two of the paper I address 
a possible candidate for the desire to inflict pain in the emotion resentment. The suggestion that 
punitiveness is a particular kind of resentment reveals punitiveness’ role in the structuring of 
cultures and as a tool of governance.  
 
Part I 
Introduction 
My target, as always, is the irenic abolition of harm in our social problem solving, and that, at least 
in part, requires a peacemaking approach to criminal justice. Let us be plain: any kind of 
peacemaking must harbour an account of penal abolition, at least why, if not how. This must be 
so, for how can we be at peace with someone upon whom we deliberately inflict pain for no reason 
other than to inflict pain. Moreover, this pain is not just inflicted upon an offender but upon their 
loved ones, their children, and their communities; indeed, the whole of society sickens as a result 
of this canker. My aim in this paper is to show that punitiveness is not a necessary, not completely 
natural, nor an inevitable part of the way that we solve social problems, indeed, it and its relations 
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are a cause of many of those problems. A significant feature of this state of affairs is the affect1 of 
punitiveness: the desire, or the experience of the desire to punish. Peculiarly, this desire to punish 
does not appear to need any personal or even real referent. When I watch a film with a particularly 
heinous baddie, I feel, deep in my innards, a desire to see him punished. This is surely a truth 
exploited in several Quentin Tarantino films such as Django Unchained, Jackie Brown, Inglorious 
Basterds, or Death Proof for example. Each of these films has an act one involving egregiously 
nasty behaviour by our villain followed by the rest of the movie which consists of terrible acts of 
revenge in which we are encouraged vicariously to delight. Indeed, this ‘revenge’ genre has a long 
and well stocked history. Perhaps this looks like vicarious revenge on our part, but I think that the 
attribute of vicariousness rules out revenge. Revenge has about it a sense of the settling of a 
personal debt, and whilst practices that we may describe as punitive have in the past relied on the 
notion of settling of debts, the rationalization of punishment in the light of Kant for example brought 
the notion of equivalence to the fore, and that of Bentham, the consequences of punishing; 
revenge is supposed no longer to play a part in the juridic act of punishment. There are few 
accounts of the role of the emotions in standard narratives of what constitutes punishment other 
than in Nietzsche, indeed, these standard accounts of the nature of punishment also leave much 
more than an account of emotion to be desired. Bedau & Kelly (2019) for example, have suggested 
that the efforts to indicate the nature of punishment have about them something of the topology 
of a moebius strip, following the contours of which always lands one back at the point of one’s 
departure, leaving one unsure what lies inside and what outside of the definition or the justification. 
          We may take it that what characterizes punitiveness is the desire to punish, however, this 
idea runs up against serious problems if we don’t know what punishment is. The answer to the 
question ‘what is punishment?’ in philosophical or penological circles can usually be traced back 
either to Anthony Flew’s (1969 [1954]) The Justification of Punishment, or H. L. A. Hart’s (2008 
[1959]) Presidential Address: Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment. Walker (1991, pp. 
1-3) suggests the following of punishment. 1) It involves the infliction of something which is 
assumed to be unpleasant. 2) The infliction is intentional and done for a reason. 3) Those who 
order it are regarded as having the right to do so. 4) The occasion of the infliction is an action or 
omission which infringes the law. 5) The person punished has played a voluntary part in the 
infringement. 6) The punisher’s reason for punishing is such as to offer a justification for punishing. 
7) It is the belief or intention of the person who orders the punishing that settles the question 
whether it is a punishment. I shall take this as the basis of the first part of our conundrum: What 
is punishment? I hope to show in part one of this essay, that punitiveness must be more, or 
different to the desire to punish in any taken-for-granted way since we do not know what 
punishment is, nor what it is for. In part two I shall examine some of the emotional phenomena 
associated with punitiveness expressed as resentment. My intent is to show that the persistence 
of the infliction of harm as punishment cannot be supported by claims that it is the will of the 
public, since popular punitiveness is not a necessary, not completely natural, nor an inevitable part 
of the way that we solve social problems, and hence that we must conclude that it is eradicable. 
What is punishment? 
Let us begin by examining these often taken-to-be-standard definitions of punishment, 1) That it 
involves the infliction of something which is assumed to be unpleasant. Forgive me, but I am going 
to sidestep this one for a moment to give myself some clear water later on, and move straight on 
to, 2) The infliction is intentional and done for a reason. That is, that the victim of punishment is 
not simply chosen at random, nor a person chosen without regard to their past behaviour. 
Miscarriages of justice are an immediate example of the weakness of this claim; such is 
 
1 Throughout this essay I make use of the word ‘affect’. I use it in three ways. First, I use it (rarely), in its 
most conventional sense as a verb that attaches to effect, second, I use it to indicate an emotional 
manifestation, that is an emergent property of emotional processes; and third, a cultural manifestation 
such as a painting and as in the use by Elias of ‘Kultur’ ‘as opposed to Zivilization’. I will try to be consistent 
and italicize the ‘a’ where I mean an emotional manifestation. 
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straightforward. However, Honderich (2006) appears (to me at least) to think that the punishment 
of innocents is a minor problem of ‘human’ mistakes (pp. 9-10)2, however, what is plain is that 
truly innocent people and ‘technically’ innocent people are punished in their thousands by the 
process of remand3. It has been taken in response to this claim by Walker (1991), Honderich 
(2006), Garland (2018), and Brookes, (2012), that sanctions called punishments, issued to people 
who have not broken a law, do not constitute punishments. What this would mean is that the so-
called punishment of innocents is not punishment at all but something else, like abuse, or torture, 
for example. However, this is a mistake. In English usage, ‘the punishment of innocents’ is a 
legitimate locution, and this is so because it is believed that it is a factical occurrence. That is, as 
far as the use of language is concerned, innocents are punished, and, indeed, more frequently 
than is conventionally acknowledged to be the case. Even if, as is conventionally the case in 
jurisprudential discussions of the nature of punishment, inflictions of violence upon the innocent 
is not counted as punishment, this cannot be said of miscarriages of justice. In these 
circumstances, of course, innocent people are punished, up until such time as the miscarriage is 
acknowledged; such punishment cannot, retrospectively, be undone – we cannot un-punish 
people.  
         David Garland, in his response to Didier Fassin’s (2018) Tanner lectures suggests that  
[t]o imagine that our jails are full of factually innocent people is pure fantasy. It mistakes 
the tragic exception for the general rule. … In these lectures everyone who is on the 
receiving end of unlawful state punishment, police violence, or penal excess is depicted as 
a harmless innocent victim, sinned against but never sinning (Garland, 2018, p. 161).  
 
However, Garland here makes of Fassin’s contention that punishment does not do what it claims, 
a straw man. Garland’s target, per contra, is different to that of Fassin, and of this paper. 
Garland’s target is merely the excessive use of punishment in the form of incarceration of the 
guilty, that is its use as a first, rather than a last resort. So, in fact, it is revealed that Garland’s 
concern is limited to the mere restriction of the use of incarceration rather than the abolition of 
punishment per se. This permits him to support the status quo with regard to Hart’s (2008 
[1959]) legalistic definition of punishment which serves to protect the law. Indeed, in a rhetorical 
manoeuvre that to my mind reeks of casuistry, Garland seems to think that remand is somehow 
of little concern and contends that the law says that those awaiting trial in jail are “merely being 
detained and [that] there is an important difference” (Garland, 2018, p. 160 my emphasis). That 
difference is revealed, he says, when one accepts that “‘innocent until proven guilty’ … is a legal 
fiction” (p. 161). We must point out here, something that Garland appears to have missed. When 
offenders are found guilty after a period on remand, the state regards their period on remand as 
having been a period of punishment and subtracts it from the remainder of the sentence as a 
portion already served. Into the bargain we should note that among the reasons given for 
placement on remand are judgements based not on presumed innocence, but guilt, because of 
the perceived probability of abscondment or reoffending of a guilty subject.  
          What is less plain where the punishment of innocents is concerned is in examples of what 
might be called police misconduct. Or perhaps more accurately, police punishment. For example, 
peaceful protest is, theoretically permissible in the United States and Europe4, however, since the 
beginning of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) campaign more than a thousand incidents of police 
brutality have been recorded in the US (Thomas, Gabbatt, & Barr, 2020). The protestors are 
present for no reason other than to protest (in the vast majority of cases). That is, they are not 
 
2 “… mistakes are made by judges and juries and hence some punishment is of … innocent people. … since 
judges and juries make mistakes, not every offender is an offender in the … ordinary sense.” (p. 10) (my 
emphasis). 
3 As of 30 June 2020, the remand population in England and Wales was 11,388 (HM Prison Service, 
2020). 
4 It is worthy of note that in the UK at the moment there is a move to criminalize a large swathe of protests. 
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there because they are all drug dealers, they are not there because they are all wanted 
perpetrators of knife crime who have all bizarrely gathered for a conference, they are legal 
protestors. Yet how can we say that they are not being punished for the legal act of protestation 
when the police pre-emptively shoot people at random with ‘less-lethal’ weapons, some suffering 
serious and sustained injury as a result. Let me suggest that they are being punished for a 
reason, and that reason is that they are protesting. The situation in France may be supposed as 
bad if not worse. The French police’s reaction to the ‘Gillet Jaune’ protesters have been similar to 
the US police’s reactions to the BLM protests, although in France the police action has resulted 
in five occasions of the severing of hands5. Perhaps we might then contend that 2) The infliction 
is intentional and done for a reason, stands on shaky ground because 4) The occasion of (reason 
for) the infliction is (should be) an action or omission which infringes the law.  
           This 4), The occasion of the infliction is an action or omission which infringes the law, 
appears to be a necessary part of the definition because 3) Those who order it should be 
regarded as having the right to do so. That is, those who order it are expected by the standard 
definitions to be those officers of the state charged with distributing punishment. This too is 
problematic because in this circumstance the state and the act of punishment become mutually 
self-justifying: the state justifies those circumstances by which it defines itself in what we might 
call Weberian terms. In these Weberian terms, the state is the state because it vouchsafes to 
itself the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, which violence it distributes (limits or 
promotes), among other ways, in the form of punishment. However, in our 3), punishment is 
justified (at one level at least) because it is administered by the state. The state creates the law, 
(and therefore defines infractions thereof), inflicts sanctions (violence) for those infractions 
(which it justifies on no better grounds than it is permitted by itself to do so) that is, it gives itself 
permission to grant itself permission to be a state, which condition is defined by its permission to 
grant itself permission to punish (use violence) monopolistically; that is, this claim is utterly 
tautologous6.  
          Our 5) The person punished has played a voluntary part in the infringement, whilst being 
taken for granted, is, of course highly problematic: the concept of voluntariness being wrapped 
up in disputes about determinism and freedom. And the concept of freedom is one of the most 
contested concepts in philosophy. What this means in this circumstance is that in order to 
establish what constitutes freedom, forms of determination are disregarded as being salient for 
political purposes, that is, the judgement of what counts as determinism, voluntarism, or 
freedom is in the gift of power; poverty is disregarded as a salient consideration in governmental 
accounts of what constitutes freedom or constraint for example. It is a truth of power (that is, it is 
circular), as is the Weberian definition of the state above, that states can do this. 
          Let us turn now to our 6) The punisher’s reason for punishing is such as to offer a 
justification for punishing. What is being suggested here is an exclusive kind of definition. It says 
that if such and such is not true then what has happened is not punishment, and that such and 
such is that the reason given for punishing must equate to a satisfactory justification for 
punishing. So, for example, if the reason for executing someone who is innocent is to further 
general deterrence, this may not count as punishment because general deterrence is not a 
satisfactory justification for the punishment of this innocent person, on the grounds that the 
punishment is not deserved. This suggests that following our ‘6)’, sanctions grounded in their 
supposed or desired consequences cannot be so justified. Finally, and briefly we may turn to our 
7) It is the belief or intention of the person who orders the punishing that settles the question 
whether it is a punishment. What is being claimed here by Walker, I believe, simply constitutes a 
 
5 “More than 200 alleged abuses related to police handling of the yellow vest protests have been 
signalled to the General Inspectorate of the National Police watchdog – and the media estimate 
there have been dozens of protestors including lost eyes and at least five severed hands” 
(Chrisafis, 2020). 
6 See also Schinkel (2009) on the circularity of the Weberian account of the state. 
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truth of power. Those who have the power to define what constitutes punishment can (and do) 
define what constitutes punishment7. 
          Condition 3) Those who order it are regarded as having the right to do so, and 4) The 
occasion of the infliction is an action or omission which infringes the law, together we have 
shown to be tautologous, and our engagement with 7) It is the belief or intention of the person 
who orders the punishing that settles the question whether it is a punishment, discloses the 
truth-of-power buried within that tautology. 5) The person punished has played a voluntary part in 
the infringement, falls because of our continuing failure to comprehend freedom and the power-
bound, perhaps political definition of claims concerning the salience of different kinds of 
determinism. 6) The punisher’s reason for punishing is such as to offer a justification for 
punishing, serves to alert us to the problematic nature of attempts to justify or give reasons for 
punishment: that is to attempt to provide justifications on the grounds of the supposed purposes 
or telos of punishment, and I shall return to this problem shortly. 
          We might suggest that the seven parts of our supposed definiens do not really constitute a 
whole definiens, but merely some things which may be hoped of the definiendum. We have noted 
that six of them are false, insufficiently true, or that they tell us nothing because they are 
tautologous. This leaves us with one, 1) That it involves the infliction of something which is 
assumed to be unpleasant. Forgive me again, but I am going to sidestep this one once more until 
I have examined what it is that punishment is claimed to be for. 
What is punishment for? 
Punishment and the promotion of social solidarity 
Having found significant difficulty embedded in the conventional philosophical account of the 
definition of punishment, we can, of course turn to a different way of questioning what 
punishment is, and that is to ask what punishment is for. There are a number of ways of 
answering this question, notably, a socio-historical one and a philosophical one. The socio-
historical group of accounts present a particularly tangled maze of ideas, so I hope that you will 
forgive that I deal only cursorily with a subject sufficient for substantial and complex book. Let me 
suggest that for convenience’s sake we may identify a number of strands within this socio-
historical mode of accounting for punishment. We may identify a theme of social solidarity, a 
theme of social control, and a theme of actions part of the political economy, at least. So, let me 
begin with the theme of social solidarity. The key idea here is often traced back to Durkheim’s 
Division of Labour in Society (2014 [1893]), Moral Education (2002 [1925]), and his Two Laws 
of Penal Evolution (1983 [1902]). For Durkheim, social solidarity is bound up with what he calls 
the ‘Collective Consciousness’8. The collective consciousness represents a correspondence in 
what persons take to be the norms of a group, and social solidarity is augmented when this 
consciousness is strengthened. Punishment is taken by Durkheim to perform a twofold roll in this 
augmentation. First, punishment arises from strong social solidarity, that is, the presence of 
agreement concerning norms or morals provides the grounds of collective support for acts of 
punishment. Second, punishment acts to cement the collective consciousness by a reaffirmation 
of the moral and normal structures of the social group. An important observation which Durkheim 
makes is that the nature of punishment has changed between agrarian societies and industrial 
societies, and he attributes this to a change in the nature of social solidarity from the mechanical 
solidarity of agrarian societies to the organic solidarity of industrial society. Two forces are at 
work here (Two Laws of Penal Evolution 1983 [1902]), there is a shift away from governance 
through religious laws (and their concomitant harsh sanctions), and there is an increase in 
organically solidaristic societies characterized by the enlightenment practice of the consideration 
of others as fellow human equals, including redeemable offenders. So, our altered solidarity with 
 
7 It may, of course, though I doubt it, be Walker simply throwing up his hands and saying, ‘I give up trying to 
define punishment’. 
8 I choose this translation over the sometimes used ‘collective conscience’, which, to my mind bears 
connotations with some kind of collective guilt, and this, most certainly, is not what Durkheim has in mind. 
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others, claims Durkheim (2014 [1893]) results in reduced punitive sentiments, and this, he 
claims is the source of the shift from somatic punishment to what Foucault would eventually call 
the punishment of the soul. Punishment became less spectacular, literally. However, let me 
suggest that the reduction in spectacular, ostensive punishment, increasingly meant a reduction 
in the visibility of punishment as witnessed in the gradual architectural transformation of the 
prison from one of dramatic castle with its dungeon, the oppressive ‘gothick’ Victorian edifices, to 
the low key, invisible, industrial-unit style prison architecture of the late 20th century9. This means 
that punishment has become anthropoemic: convicts are punished, at least in part by being cast 
out of society. An important concomitant of this shift into relative anthropoemic invisibility has 
had the effect of a reduction in the solidarity between everyday society and its victims: a lack of 
public care for our prisoners or even an antipathy or resentment towards them. That is, a 
reduction in the kind of organic solidarity with them that Durkheim suggests began the reduction 
of punishment by the torment and mutilation of the flesh. This is a significant problem for those 
who claim that the purpose of punishment is communication, which is a necessary feature of any 
account claiming the telos of punishment to be the cementation of social solidarity, since little 
communication is possible if punishment, the punished, and particularly the punisher, are 
invisible.  
          For claims concerning the defence of social solidarity, to be correct, it becomes clear that 
an account of punishment as communication is required10. Punishment as communication may 
have made more sense when punishment was more public. As Gattrell (1994) tells us, at the 
hanging of John Amy Bird Bell in 1831 that the report in The Times has the fourteen-year old’s 
last words to be “Lord have mercy upon us. All people before me take warning by me” (p. 3). I 
think it reasonable to suggest that these were not John Bell’s words but were put in his mouth as 
expected by the reporter to communicate to the readership11, not just as a warning but as a 
vicarious exculpation of society by its enjoyment of Bell’s apparent repentance before the public 
and before God. Of course, executions continued to be public in the UK until 1868, including the 
highly visible gibbetting12. Indeed, at times during the 1770s more than a hundred corpses were 
said to have hung from gibbets on Hounslow heath “so that from whatever quarter the wind blew, 
it brought with it a cadaverous and pestilential odour” (Gatrell, 1994, pp. 267-268). However, a 
simple observation may be made concerning punishment as communication in contemporary 
society and that is that it doesn’t seem to communicate very well. We are regularly informed in 
criminological literature or left-leaning newspapers, that the public’s view of what constitutes 
punishment, perhaps, in part, because of its relative invisibility, is that its prevalence is too low 
and its severity too soft or claims that prison is like a holiday camp awash with play stations and 
TVs, is considerably off the mark. Further upon this need for communication if punishment is to 
 
9 Sparks et al. (1995) have the following to say about Albany, and Long Lartin prisons in the UK. 
“both were built in architectural styles which deliberately moved away from the traditional English 
Victorian ‘galleried’ prison ... externally, like other modern high security prisons Albany and Long 
Lartin present the passer-by with a somewhat blank appearance”. (p. 101). And Garland (1990) 
has this to say: “punishment has certainly been one of those social activities which has 
increasingly been put ‘behind the scenes’ of social life. Instead of forming an aspect of everyday 
life, located in public space and openly visible to everyone … the punishment of offenders is 
nowadays undertaken in special enclaves removed from public view” (p. 234). Bender (1987) 
has suggested, the disappearance of punishment from public sight has resulted in the 
“projection of punishment into [the] imagination” (p. 231). 
10 This issue is treated at great length by R. A. Duff in his Punishment, Communication, and 
Community (2003). I must state, however, that, in broad terms, I disagree with him. 
11 Convicts confessions with their warnings provided popular literature in 18th century 
Massachusetts see Towner (1982) True Confessions and Dying Warnings in Colonial New 
England. 
12 The last gibbetting took pace I England in 1832 (Gatrell, 1994, p. 268) 
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cement solidarity, is the question, what is being communicated? To aid the augmentation or 
bolstering of solidaristic norms, it is the content of these norms that needs to be communicated, 
however, following from Walker’s 4) The occasion of the infliction is an action or omission which 
infringes the law, what is being communicated (if at all) is the substance of the law, not 
(necessarily) norms. Moreover, the nature of the law is not solidaristic, far from it, since the law 
serves to increase inequity in society in that there are “in-groups whom the law protects but does 
not bind, alongside out-groups whom the law binds but does not protect”13. Hence, it would 
appear that the claim that punishment helps secure solidarity stands on rocky foundations 
because in order to do so it is necessary that it communicates solidaristic norms. First, it is far 
from clear that it communicates at all, and second it appears that if it does communicate, it 
communicates the substance of a divisive law. Indeed, following the above, rather than 
communicating and amplifying any kind of collective consciousness, its purpose may appear to 
be the establishment and consolidation of the authority of the state. It is apposite, then, that we 
examine the claim often, made that punishment’s role is to establish authority. 
Punishment and the establishment of authority 
It has been noted (Garland, 1990) that Durkheim’s account is absent an historic picture of the 
transition between community governance and state governance, a process that had been under 
way in Western Europe since the 11th century (Lenman & Parker, 1980). At a simple level, this 
suggests that in Durkheim’s solidaristic account, he has missed those aspects of practices of 
punishment that appear to serve to establish authority. Garland (1990) suggests, and I agree with 
him, that instead of thinking of the “conscience collective as an emergent property of society as a 
whole we must conceive of a dominant moral order which is historically established by particular 
social forces” (p. 53). Punishment, then, would have the purpose of securing the dominance of a 
particular, more powerful class. However, let us remind ourselves of our question: that is, what is 
the purpose of punishment; what is it for? Perhaps what appears prima facie the most notable 
account of the relationship between punishment and authority comes from Foucault (1995), 
however Discipline and Punish is not primarily about punishment but about modes of governance, 
and contemporary penality is just one of the exemplars of a new mode of governance which 
Foucault calls governmentality: hence, Discipline and Punish does not really tell us what 
punishment is for, only what it does. Surely, however, the largest threat to claims that the purpose 
of punishment is to aid the construction of authority is the supposed nature of authority itself. This 
is a problem that has its roots in the conflation of authority with power14. Power equates merely to 
‘can’: it is not constructed but emerges from solidaristic processes of meaning-making and 
consolidation. Anyone succeeding in constructing power for themselves must have already had 
that power (capacity) to do so: the person who does something (construct power) already has the 
power to do that thing, and until they can do that thing, they do not have the power to do it15. Hence 
the notion of ‘the power to construct power’ is nonsensical, and a conflation of power with authority 
brings that same nonsense to discussions of authority. Authority is, however, a tool of or a vehicle 
 
13 To misappropriate Frank Wilhoit’s comment (no 26) following Henry’s The Travesty of Liberalism (2018) 
14 I refer to my own discussion of power 2013. Chap 7: pp 137-164. 
15 This must not be taken to mean that power equates to action, even though everything that can happen 
is happening now, see my discussion of potential in the above mentioned. I issue another mea culpa here 
in that my discussion of ‘beginning to act’ in that chapter was wrong. To grasp this, we need to conceive of 
three realms, the possible, all of which is happening now, because if something is not happening, there is 
some reason it is not happening now – something is preventing it, it can’t happen; the realm of the 
impossible, which can never happen (time going backwards for example); and a realm of the immanent, or 
potential. These are capacities which are temporally contingent upon other conditions – that is, in my 
discussion of power, the ‘ifs’ of ‘could if’: when the ‘ifs’ are satisfied that immanent potential emerges as 
factical or actual. Someone or something can do that previously merely immanent thing. It does happen. 
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of power: power to do such and such, when that such and such does not require coercion16. So, as 
Hannah Arendt (1958) asks, what is authority? or “What was – and not what is – authority? For it 
is my contention, that we are tempted and entitled to raise this question because authority has 
vanished from the modern world.”(p. 81)17 Authority (Herrschaft, in Weber) is (political) power 
without coercion. That is, according to Weber, authority has three grounds. 1. Rational grounds. 
“resting on a belief in the legality of normative rules” … 2. Traditional grounds. “resting upon 
established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions” … 3. Charismatic grounds. “resting upon 
devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual 
person …” (1978 [1905], p. 215). Each of these conditions relies on belief in, or trust in the 
authority, and trust cannot be gained by coercion. Indeed Arendt (1958) has this to say “authority 
precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed. 
Authority, on the other hand, is incompatible with persuasion” (p. 81). Nietzsche, in his second 
essay of On the Genealogy of Morality suggests that “It is [possible] to imagine society so conscious 
of its power that it could allow itself the noblest luxury available to it – that of letting its malefactors 
go unpunished” (2017 [1887], p. 49) 18 . Surely, rather than “power” Nietzsche here speaks 
precisely of authority, and authority means, inter alia, the capacity to forgo punishment. Indeed, 
Nietzsche goes on to equate this kind of authority, this forgoing of punishment, with mercy. 
          Authority, then, appears to be a cynosure for the conceptions of what constitutes legitimate 
governance amongst the authority-granting class, that is, those who have the power to grant such 
authority19. Were punishment to serve the establishment of such authority it could not be used as 
coercion, since what would be achieved, were this the case, would not be authority, but domination. 
Authority, then, cannot be created, taken, gained, applied, or constituted, it must be granted. To 
aid in the function of authority, then, punishment must communicate in a way that belief in, and 
agreement in, can be established, however, as we have seen, punishment does not seem to 
communicate. Hence, we might suggest that claims that punishment’s purpose lies in the 
construction of authority, stands on shaky ground. 
Punishment and the promotion of capitalist economy 
Several commentators have been wont to suggest that punishment reveals in itself a role in the 
functioning of the economy, most notably Rusche and Kirscheimer (2003). One must note, 
however, that revealing in itself a role, and disclosing in itself a purpose (as, indeed, we have seen 
in Foucault), are not the same thing. Amongst the earliest accounts of the imbrication of punitive 
practices with the economy are perhaps to be found in Marx’s accounts of the theft of wood in 
Bavaria in the 19th century, where the law made the collection of fallen branches for firewood 
illegal, and prosecutable by the forest owners. Marx has this to say. 
 
The wood thief has robbed the forest owner of wood, but the forest owner has made use 
of the wood thief to purloin the state itself. How literally true this is can be seen from 
§19(20), the provisions of which do not stop at imposing a fine but also lay claim to the body 
and life of the accused (Marx, 1842). 
 
16 A significant quantity of discussions of power characterize it as ‘power over’. Morriss (2002) for example 
has this to say. “[it] seems [that] all social power becomes power over someone”. This is a mistake. See my 
(xxxx) (pp. 156-159) on why this is so. 
17 We may find it odd to our contemporary ears to hear Arendt so speak, with the rise of populist 
authoritarianism in Eastern Europe, the UK and the US, but even though Arendt was writing in the late 50s-
early 60s we should not be too quick to dismiss her comments. Authoritarianism is not characterized by 
authority but by coercion. 
18 The older, Golffing translation (Nietzsche, 1956) has “It is possible to imagine a society flushed with 
such a sense of power that it could afford to let its offenders go unpunished. What greater luxury is there 
for a society to indulge in” (p. 205). 
19 And in a democracy, this should be the demos. 
20 Of the Sixth Rhine Province Assembly’s law on thefts of wood in 1842. 
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Clearly, Marx believes that the purpose of punishment in this circumstance, by conceptually 
divorcing wood from its various social relationships, is to promote a privatization of the state (in 
the form of the violence of punishment) by the forest owner. A similar analysis is offered By E. P. 
Thompson in his inquiry into the Black Assizes in Whigs and Hunters (1974). The Black Act of 
1723 was in part directed at one of the major outcomes of the clearances in England and 
Scotland, namely that of roving bands of poachers of which the Waltham Blacks were notorious. 
Well over 30021 new capital offences were created all of them largely or in part to secure the 
ownership of the newly cleared estates and their contents. We may feel that this is a genuine 
case of punishment being for the securing of the capital advantage of the land owners, but the 
Black Act persisted ‘only’ as far as 1823 and as such, may be seen as a relatively short period in 
which this telos was attached to punishment. Moreover, the punishment was not to clear the 
land, but to quell the result thereof, namely the problem of indigent groups of unemployed 
created by the clearances. Rusche and Kirscheimer, however, in their classic ‘Punishment and 
Social Structure’ (2003) begin with the transfer of penal power in the Middle Ages from the local 
community to an increasingly punitive central agency and this, evolved from the ‘Roman Law’ 
practice of settling debts, to one of enriching judges and justiciaries. The law became the 
preserve of the rich whilst the poor were subject to corporal punishments of branding, whipping, 
mutilation, and capital punishment with the attendant display of corpses. These practices 
according to Rusche and Kirscheimer, however were not indicative of a general barbarity of 
humanity now passed (although Elias (2012 [1939]), I think, would disagree), but part of a 
transition from local agrarian economies to grander capitalistic and leisured forms of land use 
attendant on the clearances and the shift of pasturage methods to those favouring the newly 
cleared estates: the farming of sheep and cattle for example instead of local arable rotation with 
tithes, previously common. The attendant penal codes, Rusche and Kirscheimer claim, served to 
protect and promote the wealth of the landowners who included the judiciary and the Church as 
well as nobles. 
          Rusche and Kirscheimer (2003) go on to claim that the rise of global mercantilism brought 
about a change in punishment practices – galley slavery, transportation, and various forms of 
“penal servitude at hard labour” (p. 24). The authors claim that the driver of this was the 
persistent shortage of labour throughout Europe due to things like the wars of religion in France, 
the Thirty years War which raged through most of the 17th century22 and the black death. Rusche 
and Kirscheimer are convinced that the penal logic at work here is purely economic. Those 
selected for galley slavery were notable for their bodily strength or special labouring skills, rather 
than any sort of equivalence with whatever offences they had committed. Selection was 
“determined solely by the desire to obtain necessary labour on the cheapest possible basis” 
(Rusche & Kirchheimer, 2003, p. 55). Technical improvements to sailing ships brought an end to 
galley slavery, which was replaced by transportation to the colonies where the convicts 
performed work for the new rich administrators and landowners in those colonies on the same 
capitalistic basis as had been the galley slaves. 
          The practice of transportation to the United States was brought to an end by the outbreak 
of the Revolutionary War in 1775. This resulted in the overcrowding of England’s prison hulks 
and the eventual resumption of transportation in 1786, this time to the British colony of New 
South Wales. Transportation was eventually brought to an end in England in 1857 with the penal 
servitude act. Whilst it may appear that galley slavery and transportation were clear examples of 
the purpose of punishment being to enrich the bourgeoisie, waters are muddied by sentences of 
penal servitude. These sentences were served in convict prisons and houses of correction, and 
hard labour was their standard feature. However, these tasks frequently were not productive but 
sisyphean in nature and included such activities as the treadmill, the crank handle, and lifting the 
 
21 “… the approximate number of cases in which the punishment of death could be ordered under the 
Waltham Black Act [was] close to the fantastic number of over (sic) three hundred and fifty.” (Radzinowicz, 
1945, p. 72).  
22 and killed approaching 60% of the Central European population, (Outram, 2002). 
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shot, as Bentham would have it “grinding rogues honest and idle men industrious” (1838, p. 342 
Volume IV) Be that as it may, in 1887, 75% of prison inmates were involved in some sort of 
productive endeavour, mostly in private contract and leasing systems. By 1935 the portion of 
prisoners working had fallen to 44%, and almost 90% of those worked in state-run programmes 
rather than for private contractors (Reynolds, 1994). The waters are further muddied by Loïc 
Wacquant’s more recent (2001) analysis which suggests that what he calls the hyperghetto, 
which he describes as an extension of the ‘carceral continuum’, now serves the function of 
‘warehousing’ a population that used to comprise the ‘reserve army of labour’ (Engels, 2009 
[1845]), localized economically surplus populations having been rendered redundant by 
globalization. As Wacquant puts it, “[i]nstead of providing a reservoir of cheap labor, the 
hyperghetto now stores a surplus population devoid of market utility” (p. 105). We might 
contend, therefore, that it is far from clear that we can say with any safety that punishment is for 
the promotion of economic forces. Just as we can say that it is not the case that the reason, as 
Voltaire’s friend (Voltaire, 1924 [1765]) would have it, that tides ebb and flow is to better 
facilitate the ingress of ships, so, just because situations are manipulated for political or 
economic ends does not mean that those situations are the way they are in order that they can 
be put to those political or economic ends. Hence, the fact that convicts were put to work as 
oarsmen does not mean that the purpose of punishment was to provide maritime labour, any 
more than the oar was created as a tool of penal misery. That unscrupulous businessmen exploit 
the conditions provided by punishments does not mean that their gain is the reason for 
punishing.  
          Let us, then, take stock. My second attempt to state clearly what punishment is and hence 
what punitiveness is, has taken the form of asking what punishment it is for. I briefly addressed 
two groups of claims that the purpose of punishment was some kind of social engineering. I 
suggested that for punishment to exist for the purpose of augmenting social solidarity it is 
necessary that it communicate solidaristic norms. Unfortunately, it seems that this is not really 
the case, first because it does not seem to communicate, and second because if it does 
communicate, then what it communicates is the law, not norms. I also briefly examined claims 
that punishment’s purpose is to benefit the functioning of a capitalist economy. Regrettably, 
despite the ostensible appearance of some of the evidence, each of these claims fails due to the 
fallacious belief that an institution’s purpose can be deduced from its function. However, are we 
to grasp what punishment is for, there are other claimed functions that may, at least, sound more 
plausible, and those are the functions of crime control: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, 
retribution, and restitution. I shall proceed to illuminate some of the concerns with these claims 
here. 
Punishment and the promotion of crime control 
For punishment to deter, it must deter. That is, it must prevent the deterred person from 
committing a crime that they were going to commit. The same is true of incapacitation. Should a 
person not be going to commit a crime, they have neither been deterred nor incapacitated. The 
first problem arises in that an offender’s first offence is his first offence. That is, there is no 
precedent for it, hence no statistical judgements about future crime they may commit can be 
made. Thus, no judgement can be made about whether a first-time offender will be deterred by 
any punishment. It is true that first time offenders are regularly not given custodial sentences23, 
but that is not to say that they are not punished. Perpetrators of the most heinous crimes, from 
whom we may feel we need the greatest protection, whom we wish to be the most deterred are, 
however, statistically the least likely to recidivate and hence are the least likely to be deterred or 
incapacitated (Cuthbertson, 2017). The precise converse is true of those guilty of more minor 
offences; these offenders are much more likely to recidivate, and so more likely to be deterred, 
and yet we feel that they are less deserving of incapacitatory or deterrent sentencing. Ergo, there 
 
23 As of December 2017, “First time offenders account for less than 8% of prison sentences” in England 
and Wales.(Cuthbertson, 2017) 
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appears to be an inverse relationship between our ideas of equivalence and desert, and our 
perception of the risk posed by an offender, and punishment’s capacity to deliver either 
deterrence or incapacitation. 
          A further problem concerning whether or not punishment can be said to deter or 
incapacitate has to do with what has been called criminal careers in the work of ‘life course’ 
criminologists. It has been brought to our attention by writers such as Sampson & Laub (1993, 
2005) that most offending takes place in the late teens and early twenties of the offender’s life. 
This means that the longer someone is incapacitated the less are the chances of the 
incapacitation being actual or real. A further consideration to bring to the table is that if people 
are deterred from committing crimes, whether it is the facticity of punishment that is doing the 
deterring. Kleck has this to say on the matter (Kleck, 2014) 
          Extant evidence indicates that individual perceptions of the certainty, severity, and 
swiftness of punishment have essentially no correlation with actual levels of those measures of 
risk prevailing in the area in which the individuals reside. This suggests that public policies that 
are designed to reduce crime by increasing the deterrent effect of punishment are unlikely to 
succeed because they are not likely, in general, to increase prospective offenders’ perception 
of the legal risks of committing crime24. This does not mean that there are no deterrent effects 
of the threat of punishment, but only that variations in objective levels of punishment may not 
affect the magnitude of any deterrent effects that do exist. (p. 1014) 
          The reason for this may be as Wikström et al (2011) suggest: 
 
Our findings support the assumption derived from situational action theory that one 
important reason many people do not engage in acts of crime (particular types of crime) is 
that they do not see crime (a particular crime) as an action alternative, rather than that 
they abstain from it because they fear the consequences (their assessment of the risk of 
getting caught). People who do not see crime as an action alternative do not tend to engage 
in crime regardless of whether they assess the risk of getting caught as very high or very 
low. (p. 417) 
 
Furthermore, the UK Government appeared to recognize that there is no evidence to support a 
direct correlation between the severity of punishment and its deterrent effect25 
 
[T]here seems to be no link between marginal changes in punishment levels and changes 
in crime rates … It is the prospect of getting caught that has deterrence value, rather than 
alterations to the ‘going rate’ for severity of sentences … The evidence suggests that any 
new sentencing framework should make no new assumptions about deterrence. (Home 
Office, 2000, pp. 8-9) 
 
          It would appear, then, that the number of people actually deterred by the materiality of 
punishment is very low indeed. Incapacitation fares similarly. Whilst it is largely true (not 100%) 
that an offender who is incarcerated is not at liberty to commit further offences the judgement of 
whether this genuinely constitutes incapacitation (prevention of a real future crime) runs up 
against the problem of false positives, in that we cannot know whether or not the person 
convicted and putatively incapacitated was indeed at risk of committing more crimes. 
          A similarly risk based intervention came about in 2000 following the murder of Lin and 
Megan Russell in 1996. In the following year Michael Stone was convicted of the crime. Stone 
had a history of mental health problems and was known to have issued death threats. Questions 
were asked concerning why Stone could not have been pre-emptively incarcerated in a mental 
health institution and the reply from the Home Office was that it was illegal to lock up a person 
 
24 Let us note that here, again, is evidence of the failure of punishment to communicate. 
25 See also (Doob & Webster, 2003; Nagin, 1998; von Hirsch, Bottoms, Wokström, & Burney, 1999) 
Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology                                                        Essay:  Punitiveness & Resentment  
2021 July/August Vol13: 64-91                                                                                       Crewe 
 
 
 
75 
 
with mental health problems if that problem was not treatable. The response of the then 
government was to get the psychiatric profession to agree to the definition of a new psychiatric 
condition which they called Dangerous Severe Personality Disorder, which, it was claimed could 
be treated, and that those diagnosed with the condition must be housed in special units new for 
the purpose. The pertinent fact here is that the new units were not placed in mental hospitals, 
but in high security jails. Whilst the claim that this decision was made on grounds of public 
safety, it is clear that at least an element of the infliction of punishment, the imposition of pain or 
harm was involved26. 
Punishment as education, treatment, rehabilitation, or correction. 
Neither Education nor treatment, rehabilitation nor corrections, or indeed any form of ‘re-
training’ requires the infliction of pain. 
Punishment and the infliction of pain. 
It has been my aim to proceed along these lines, as Sherlock Holmes puts it in The Sign of the Four 
“when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the 
truth”27. I have considered several assumed claims concerning what constitutes punishment and 
found them all wanting, that is, all but one, viz, Walker’s No.1) It involves the infliction of something 
which is assumed to be unpleasant. Let us not be so prissy; following Christie (1981), it involves 
the infliction of pain. This is the claim (in Holmes’ terms) that “remains”. In the Nichomachean 
ethics, Aristotle brings to our attention the word epikhairekakia (ἐπιχαιρεκακία) as one of a group 
of three terms with phthonos 28  (φθόνος), and nemesis (νέμεσις). The word has an English 
equivalent, epicaricacy, etymologically derived from the terms for 'upon' epi (ἐπί) , 'joy' chara (χαρά) 
and 'evil’ kakon (κακόν) . It is closely related to the anglicised German word schadenfreude: joy at 
another’s (perceived justified) misfortune. These words speak of a commonly expressed sentiment, 
the joy at so called justice having been done. Justice, (often nothing more than presumed ‘just 
deserts’) when expressed in this way simply means pain. We can say this because the sentiment 
does not go along with any reasonable idea of what constitutes justice: that is, desert. Whilst this 
word schadenfreude alerts us to the capacity to delight in another’s suffering, it refers to joy at the 
point of infliction of pain or after it, whereas, punitiveness refers to a period before the infliction: a 
desire or will to inflict pain in the future if you will. (I will suggest later that the frustrated, future-
oriented nature of desire or will to correct a perceived slight, permits resentment of the supposed 
wrongdoer to fester, such that it evolves into a desire to inflict pain in the name of this impoverished 
notion of justice.) I cannot conceive of a single occasion of punishment that does not involve the 
visitation of pain or harm of some sort upon a victim. The question remains, however, whether this 
is what punishment is for. Nietzsche’s account, has it that punishment arises out of our capacity 
to make promises, and that failure to keep promises constitutes debt. The mode of repayment of 
a debt becomes an issue if the debtor cannot repay the debt in its original form. In this 
circumstance the creditor is permitted to take something that the debtor still possesses, including 
parts of his body (this is surely Shylock’s pound of flesh). Of interest to Nietzsche here is that no 
equivalence is involved, and points to this injunction from the twelve tables of Roman law ‘si plus 
minusve secuerunt, ne fraude esto’ 29 . This Nietzsche (2017 [1887]) takes to indicate that 
compensation for the debt may be taken in the form of pleasure at the suffering of the debtor. This 
is, surely, in line with his notion of the will to power. Here it is power over the debtor without a 
thought; that is the pleasure ‘de faire de le mal pour le plaisir de la faire’ (p. 42). So, it would seem, 
that the breach of a promise (to an individual, or to society) which breach we may often conceive 
of as a crime, may also be seen as a debt for which compensation is required, and that we take 
 
26 See also Bruce Arrigo’s (2002) Punishing the mentally Ill. 
27 This is called the method of agreement by Mill (2015 [1843]) 
28 jealousy  
29 If they have cut off more or less, let that not be considered a crime. 
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pleasure in exacting that payment through suffering. We may also see that compensation as the 
basis of punishment. Hence punishment is the infliction of pain, suffering, or harm. 
          We will certainly be left wondering if it is true that we revel in the suffering of others. Of 
course, Nietzsche thinks that such delight in suffering is present in the bacchanalian practices of 
‘the ancients’. “[I]t was not so long ago” he says, “it was unthinkable to hold a royal wedding or 
full-scale festival for the people without executions, tortures or perhaps an auto-da-fé” (2017 
[1887], p. 43). A situation or condition which he describes as “human-all-too-human” (p. 44). As 
Adelson (2005) makes us aware, for example, people with the condition of dwarfism were ‘kept’ 
by wealthy families so that the members of the family might entertain themselves by ridiculing the 
dwarf and by taking delight in their suffering. As testament we may bring to mind the frequent 
depictions of people with dwarfism in family portraits of the 15th to the 18th centuries, perhaps 
most famously in Velasquez’s Las Meninas30.We are also aware, however, that Elias (2012 [1939]) 
was of the opinion that these cruelties were gradually disappearing from society through the 
processes of civilization31, and this may prima facie appear to be so. That is until we see images 
of lynchings in the US up to the 1930s. It has been contended by Mowatt (2009) that attendance 
at lynchings was treated as a pleasurable leisure activity 32 , a situation attested to by the 
photograph of the lynching of Thomas Shipp and Abram Smith 33  where we may witness 
merrymaking locals grinning inanely into the camera34. As I write, the death of the serial killer Peter 
Sutcliffe aka the Yorkshire ripper is news in the UK. Scenes from his 1980 arrest appear on the 
news bulletin, with hundreds of people in Dewsbury – a small town in West Yorkshire UK - standing 
outside the police station braying for ‘justice’. More protesters appear today as though wishing he 
were still alive so that more suffering could be inflicted upon him. What seems to me to be in 
evidence here is not joy as Nietzsche might expect us to experience but a vacuous hatred, a sheer 
will to inflict pain. Pain devoid of any pretence of any equivalence or commensurability. Indeed, 
that capacity to judge equivalence has been precluded by the removal of punishment from the 
public gaze, and the concomitant failure of punishment to communicate. The purpose of 
punishment, then, appears to be nothing more than the infliction of pain, and that is pain inflicted 
in a gratuitous, senseless way. Punitiveness, then, must be the will to do this and the human 
behaviour which conforms to this pattern at least in part, I suggest, is resentment. 
 
30 https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p060c5m8  
31 See also Pratt (2002). 
32 Professional photographers set up shop at the scene of these lynchings and did a brisk business selling 
photo-souvenirs of the event. Images of mutilated black bodies, some of them horribly burned and 
disfigured, were purchased as picture postcards, and passed between friends and families like holiday 
mementoes, dutifully delivered by the U.S. mail. One postcard, with a photograph showing a large crowd in 
downtown Dallas, is addressed to "Dr. J.W.F. Williams, Lafayette, Christian County, Kentucky" and reads: 
"Well John – This is a token of a great day we had in Dallas, March 3rd [1910], a negro was hung for an 
assault on a three year old girl. I saw this on my noon hour. I was very much in the bunch. You can see the 
Negro hanging on a telephone pole." Another, carrying an image of the charred, barely recognizable, corpse 
of Jesse Washington, suspended from a utility pole in Robinson, Texas, was sent by Joe Meyers to his 
parents in May 1916. The message reads: "This is the Barbecue we had last night my picture is to the left 
with a cross over it your son Joe." A third carries a photograph showing a group of onlookers (including 
several young boys), posing with Lige Daniels, who had been hung from an oak in the town square of 
Center, Texas, in August 1920. The message on the reverse says: "This was made in the court yard, In 
Center, Texas, he is a 16 year old Black boy, He killed Earl's Grandma, She was Florence's mother. Give 
this to Bud. From Aunt Myrtle." (Garland, 2005) 
33 https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/the-lynching-of-thomas-shipp-and- abram-smith-the-
african-news-photo/520830453?adppopup=true  
34 See in particular Allen (2000). This is a collection of lynching postcards including the messages sent with 
them. 
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Part Two 
It appears from the foregoing that it is inadequate to equate punitiveness merely to a desire to 
punish, on the grounds, a) that we do not appear really to know what punishment is, b) punishment 
does not appear to actually be what we take it to be, c) it does not do what we want it to do, and 
d) it does not do what it is claimed that it does. Indeed, I have suggested in line with Christie (1981) 
that punishment reduces solely to the infliction of pain. Consequently, I wish to move now to a 
different approach to the analysis of punitiveness. That is, at least in part, to separate it, 
analytically, from punishment. What I wish to do is examine punitiveness as an affect. That is not 
in any way to suggest that punitiveness is not related to juridic punishment, but to conjecture that 
those affective processes that propel the desire to punish also propel other emotions, and vice 
versa, and by so doing show that punitiveness is not a necessary, not completely natural, nor an 
inevitable part of the way that we solve social problems. In taking this tack, I shall maintain that all 
societies regulate certain expressions, emotions, and sensibilities, promoting some and restricting 
or even repressing others. This generates certain characteristically defining affect structures 
belonging to different societies and cultures35. The relative excessive punitiveness of the United 
States and of the UK, one might suggest, is just one such culturally determined affect structure, 
and we are right to ask why this is peculiarly so. Above, I suggested that one of the reactive attitudes 
that appears close to punitiveness, to me at least, is resentment; thus I shall begin.  
Resentment 
Resentment conventionally 
Conventional philosophical wisdom has it that resentment is a reaction to a demeaning action on 
the part of another; an action that leaves one feeling that one’s status has been lowered in the 
eyes of others (Murphy, 1998 [1982]). Much of the philosophical literature on resentment 
concentrates on this individual experience, perhaps following from Murphy’s (1998 [1982]) 
‘Forgiveness and Resentment’. We should note however, that Murphy’s paper is really about 
forgiveness and his discussion about resentment really only a foil, better to illustrate forgiveness 
as the forgoing of resentment. Hence Murphy has this to say. “[R]esentment … functions primarily 
in defense, not of all moral values and norms, but rather of certain values of the self” (p. 16). Here 
Meltzer and Mussolf: (2002) “In common usage, “resentment” refers to a feeling of displeasure 
induced by being insulted, offended, or deprived. Thus, it is typically a reaction to slights or affronts, 
to assaults, whether mild or severe, upon one’s self” (p. 240). And Hampton (1998 [1988]), the 
following, “[resentment is] a protest against the demeaning action but also a defense against the 
action’s attack on one’s self-esteem” (p. 56). Unfortunately, however, these individualistic 
accounts of resentment cannot account for resentments which arise out of systemic harms or 
slights. It cannot account, for example, for resentment of the male establishment for its persistent 
and insistent undervaluing and mistreatment of women. It cannot account for the resentment of 
the misogyny that occurs in social life in general. To point then, to just these two examples reveals 
that resentment can be not just of individuals or individual slights upon ourselves as individuals, 
but of what we might refer to as circumstances. One can resent having to take a dozen different 
pills every day, (I do), for example. Such things are not responses to any kind of individual slight or 
wrongdoing to the self. Walker (2006) has argued that relying on descriptions of the targets of 
resentment as “harmful and insulting treatment intentionally inflicted” (p. 135) promotes images 
of personal violence, abuse, and disrespectful behaviour, and makes light of the pervasiveness of 
resentment in everyday life. Moreover, I may harbour resentment towards the perpetrator of a 
wrong that is not in my direct experience. I may, as I suggested a moment ago, resent misogynists, 
whilst, clearly, never having experienced misogyny directed at myself. I resent racists, whilst never 
 
35 I refer to my concept of culture as the site of the process of making meanings ‘compossible’ to use 
Husserl’s term. That is, the site of the process of making and sharing meanings. See my (2013, pp. 170-
178 in particular ) 
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having been the victim of racism directly (of course we are all victims of misogyny and racism 
indirectly). These are aspects of resentment not supported by conventional models of resentment.  
Collective resentment 
If popular punitiveness and resentment are related to one another then, contrary to the somewhat 
individualistic sensibilities discussed above, the resentment of which we would speak is not 
individualistic in fashion but collective. We are aware that people may experience resentment as 
part of their response to a perceived threat to a collective to which they belong (Stockdale, 2013). 
The kidnap and murder of Sarah Everard in London on 3 March (2021) has elicited a significant 
response from large quantities of women, promoting mass vigils in several places. The resentment 
felt is not about an individually experienced event but a response to belonging to a particular group 
of people, women, and that women, collectively, are the victims of abusive and misogynistic 
behaviour from another class of people: men. The problem with my example here is that this 
behaviour by men is very real. Not all perceived slights are as factical in this way, and indeed, as 
Bender (1987) has suggested, the disappearance of punishment from public sight has resulted in 
the “projection of punishment into [the] imagination” (p. 231). But the point here is that one can 
feel resentment in regard of a slight to someone other than oneself; one would feel resentment 
toward the abuser of a member of one’s family or of one’s friend, for example. It is not a big stretch, 
therefore, to find resentment of an offence against one’s class, culture, peer group, ethnicity etc., 
not only possible but probable. Another kind of collective resentment may be envisaged, and that 
is resentment of a slight to the image of a group or class. The perpetrator of abuse against women 
may be resented by men as their actions reinforce an image of all men as abusers who think of 
women as objects for their sexual gratification.  
Resentment, harm and durability. 
Perhaps the most difficult problem when talking about resentment arises from the difference 
between what we might call the Scottish, and the French conceptions of the phenomenon. 
According to Adam Smith and his followers – amongst whom we may count Murphy (1998 [1982]) 
and recent others – resentment is a part of the natural, indispensable equipment of moral and 
social life, through which we express our investment in social norms and expectations, and where 
we also express the expectation that the resented will do likewise. In this conception there is little 
room for the punitive, indeed, it should be noted that it is in part a foundation for notions of the 
redeemability of offenders. The French conception of the phenomenon one might suggest has its 
strongest expression in Nietzsche and is quite different. Rather than the perception of resentment 
as being something rather unfortunate, individual, and fugitive, which to my mind also has about 
it a quality of American white middle-class equanimity – the reaction to a rude or inattentive boss, 
perhaps – resentment in Nietzsche (2017 [1887]) and Scheler (1961 [1915]) etc, is a passionate 
experience. The differences, broadly, are these. Punitive, Nietzschean resentment involves the 
desire for harm, it is collective in nature, it is durable, manipulable, and contagious, and in line 
with these differences is given another name, ‘resentiment’. Both Nietzsche and Scheler specify 
that ressentiment comprises feelings of hatred, wrath, envy, revenge, and the like (Meltzer & 
Musolf, 2002). This is much more in accord with our experience of the kind of feeling attendant 
upon punitiveness. Indeed, supporting the view that resentiment involves desires to inflict harm 
Scheler (1961 [1915], pp. 177, 198) attributes the French Revolution to an “enormous explosion 
of ressentiment”. Let us suggest that the experience of offence naturally (forgive me) results in the 
desire for redress or revenge even. Should such feelings have no legitimate outlet, that is, should 
the desire for revenge be (futurally) frustrated, it might be suggested that it ‘festers’, chronically 
into a durable punitive resentiment. This sensibility now has two of the characteristics outlined 
above: durability, and the desire for harm. Indeed, Scheler (1961 [1915], p. 50) contends that 
revenge becomes translated into resentiment the more it is directed against long term feelings of 
impotence in the face of perceived injury. Hence, Solomon (1994) suggests (although contradicting 
Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s belief in ‘bottom up’ resentment) that perceived impotence or decrease 
in power, status, or entitlement – or perception of such – is a crucial component of resentiment. 
As Barbalet (1998) has it “[b]oth resentment and ressentiment are “based not on personal 
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involvement so much as personal insight in the disjuncture between social rights and social 
outcomes [(future) DJC]” (p. 137). If this is so – and it appears to correspond with our personal 
experiences and observation – we should expect the desire to inflict harm to occur chiefly when 
the agents of acts engendering either resentment or ressentiment are of lower status (and power) 
than the aggrieved. Although, it is the case that we can perceive a slight from free-riders from 
higher status individuals or classes, where punitiveness is concerned I believe this more commonly 
the case that resentment is directed downwards, and this is probably the so because those of 
higher status (for want of a better term) more readily have the capacity for mystification, 
misdirection, and manipulation, something to which I will now turn. 
Manipulability: Resentment and punishment 
I wish now to trace evidence of a the development of a certain kind of resentment that can be 
related to punitive feelings. As we have seen above, and through the work of Driver (2004) and of 
Reynolds (1994), the workhouse may be thought of as an extension of the penal apparatus in the 
UK during the 19th century, particularly because of its poor conditions and its insistence on 
sisyphean labour. But we may in addition, think of the workhouse as being a carceral institution, 
in that one of the injunctions governing the institutions was that those incarcerated were not 
permitted freedom of movement36. Moreover, should they break the rules of the workhouse the 
inmates were liable for a fine of between five and ten pounds, that is, 500 to a thousand times 
their typical weekly earnings of two (‘old’ UK37) pennies. These conditions were governed by the 
Poor Law Amendment Act ("An Act for the Amendment and Better Administration of the Laws 
Relating to the Poor in England and Wales.," 1834) (also known as the New Poor Law) and its 
contents of a provision that has become known as ‘less eligibility’ which states that the situation 
of the able-bodied recipient of poor relief “on the whole shall not be made really or apparently as 
eligible as the independent labourer of the lowest class.” ‘Eligible’ in this circumstance means 
desirable. We may reasonably suggest that the workhouses and the poor laws were not designed 
to alleviate poverty but pauperism (Driver, 2004): that is, to prevent the supposed indolent poor 
from benefiting from public assistance, leading Charles Dickens to say, “we have come to this 
absurd, this dangerous, this monstrous pass, that the dishonest felon is, in respect of cleanliness, 
order, diet, and accommodation, better provided for, and taken care of, than the honest pauper” 
(1850). In this light, the New Poor Law is to be seen as a typical piece of Whig-Benthamite utilitarian 
legislation. Nonetheless, I wish to shed light here on something which I will develop shortly, namely 
that as an act of governance, the new Poor law acts through the inculcation of resentment both 
toward the recipient of “poor relief”, and towards the presumed “dishonest felon”, and that that 
resentment rests upon an apprehension of the resented class as free riders. The principle of less 
eligibility is founded upon the utility of deterrence, but it is also founded upon discrimination of the 
deserving and undeserving in welfare provision (Sparks, 1996). For the believer in less eligibility’s 
deterrent properties a robust retributivism existed alongside moral compulsion since anything else 
would constitute an affront to the ‘honest labourer’. As such, less eligibility serves a role in dividing 
the sufferers from society’s ills into ‘me’ deserving, and ‘you’ undeserving. Even in the realm of 
penal transportation, concerns over less eligibility arose when reports of ex-convicts having ‘made 
good’ were received by poorer relations left at home (Mannheim, 1939). Of course, this is a two 
way street in that whilst the state creates (in part) the segmentation, and the concerns of the 
divided poor, it simultaneously reflects them back, to its political advantage. 
 
36 For example Rule VI of the rules of the house at Aylesbury state “That none absent themselves from the 
House without leave” (Gibbs, 1835) or the rules of Doncaster workhouse “[those poor] who are desirous of 
going out [do so] only at the same time of year at which they came in” (Sheardown, 1867), or Hackney, 
“that no person be permitted to go out from the house without leave from the committee” (Higginbotham, 
2016). 
37 Until 1971: 12 ‘old’ pennies = 1 shilling = 5 ‘new’ pence = 5% of 1 pound sterling (current). 
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The sentiments that drive the doctrine of less eligibility are clearly not constantly in the forefront of 
the populace’s nor the lawmakers’ minds. Following the Gladstone committee’s 1895 replacement 
of the deterrent ideal with the rehabilitative ‘good and useful life’, less eligibility receded from the 
vanguard of penal aims (Sparks, 1996). Even so, the doctrine continues to bubble under the 
surface, resurfacing in times of political and economic upheaval (Mannheim, 1939; Melossi, 
1993). Similarly Sparks (1996) observes that during 1993 and 1994, during the tenure of Michael 
Howard as UK Home Secretary, there was a significant revival in the doctrine of less eligibility, 
following upon an academic revival of classical theories of crime, notably from criminologists like 
James Q Wilson (1985) who describes a class of rational parasitic criminals whom he refers to as 
‘the calculators’. The implication here is that there exists a ‘class’ of criminals, and that such a 
class is predatory on ‘your’ class, and that they are benefiting at ‘your’ expense. In other words, 
Michael Howard’s rhetoric and that of Wilson has the effect of sensitizing the population to the 
supposed presence of ‘free riders’. The relationship of such rhetoric to less eligibility is to be 
observed in the headlines of the UK tabloid newspapers that persistently speak of prisons as 
‘Holiday Camps’ and of prison cells awash with play stations and the like38. The object, again, is to 
appeal to a sense of ‘them’ as free riders enjoying a life of greater ‘eligibility’ than ‘you’, the honest 
hard working, law abiding citizen can afford, and to inculcate feelings of resentment39. Such 
politicking is startlingly in evidence throughout Europe and the US currently with the rise of regimes 
such as that of Viktor Orbán in Hungary or the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) party in 
Poland, the myth of job-stealing Eastern European immigrants in the UK and the resentment and 
hatred harboured by Evangelical Christians and neglected white male voters in the US. These 
resentments, falling as they do, some way away from the very poorest in society were, of course 
observed by Runciman (1966) and by Stauffer (1949) whose analyses form the basis of the 
concept of relative deprivation to be found in perspectives like ‘Left Realism’. Their observations 
pointed to the greatest resentment being present among those in the middle of society. 
          We might point out that Durkheim thought that although punishment is enforced upon 
those categorized as criminals it “is above all intended to have its effect upon honest people” 
(2014 [1893], p. 83). This is very much in line with Habermas’ (1976) ‘legitimation crisis’, that is, 
loosely, the notion that governments respond to the boundaries of possibility by generating 
concerns that it is capable of addressing, and hence diverting, through mystification and  
misdirection, attention from those it is not. Whilst I have mentioned some relatively 
commonplace adjudications of circumstances or of the behaviour of others that give rise to 
resentful attitudes, such as erosion of traditional cultural practices, economic inequality, erosion 
of traditionally held (assumed) entitlement, perceived slight or insult, for example. What we are 
interested in in this paper is adjudications of behaviour associated with punitiveness. Clearly, we 
may make negative adjudications concerning our own individual victimisation such as oneself 
having been burgled or assaulted, for example, and we may feel resentful, particularly if the 
individual offender is perceived to have been leniently dealt with. This kind of reaction, like 
Murphy’s (1998 [1982]) kind of resentment, occurs at an individual level and has very much to 
do with individual circumstances and individual histories which personal affects are not really 
what this paper is about. We are interested particularly in the collective phenomenon of popular 
punitiveness, and the punitive resentment of whole classes. 
          The development of the public notion of a criminal ‘class’ such as Wilson’s ‘calculators’, as 
opposed to a criminal individual, is not new. The study of criminological topics is at its core the study 
of difference and similarity between this group and that, between this culture and the other 
 
38 Those readers unfamiliar with the British Tabloid Press, should know that they are notorious for 
dissembling, economy with the ‘actualité’, or downright lying. 
39 My wife likes to tell a story of two people sat opposite one another on a train. One is sat behind a huge 
pile of doughnuts so high they have to stretch to see round them. Opposite is someone with a single 
doughnut. The person with the huge pile speaks to the person with one donut, and, pointing to a person 
passing, says “watch out, he’s trying to steal your doughnut!” 
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(Crewe, 2015). We may also say with some confidence that systems of punishment are devised 
by some for imposition upon others. We have seen, above, that Nietzsche was of the opinion that 
punishment has its roots in the offering and failure of promises, and the consequent private 
obligations, and progressed therefrom to systems of retribution that represented resentiment of 
whole classes, of people of other classes. Foucault indicates in his lectures at the College de 
France (2018 [1973]) on the 17th and 24th of January 1973, that the mid-18th century analyses 
of Le Trosne40 (similar to those of E. P. Thomson, and Douglas Hay above) suggested a shift in 
the ‘systematicity’ of punishment as a result of vagabondism. Le Trosne advances the 
enlightenment sentiment that an offence against one member of society constitutes an offence 
against society as a whole and that the unemployed vagabond (and groups thereof) are 
parasitical on society as a whole, leading Foucault to suggest that this constitutes the beginning 
of the notion of the criminal (class) as an enemy of society. Concomitantly, as the affect of 
punitiveness manifests itself both at the individual and the collective level and in consequence 
any concept we choose or design to make sense of this phenomenon must similarly function as a 
shared as well as a personal phenomenon. For successful collective and shared social 
recognition to take place the putative other must be defined in a way that is as inclusive as 
possible and that frequently means as loosely as possible. Where the inculcated resentment of 
immigrants is concerned for example, recently in the UK over the so called ‘Brexit’ debate and its 
adjuvant migrant debates, such immigrants were variously labelled as both coming from the EU 
or not coming from the EU. The important thing to realize was that ‘someone’ was trying to steal 
your work and it was right to conceive of ‘them’ as being a parasitic class. It is also noteworthy 
that the putative victims of such a parasitic class are also treated as a class, in this case, ’the 
public’, in the White Paper ‘Justice for All’, 
 
[1] The public are sick and tired of a sentencing system that does not make sense. [2] They 
read about … serious offenders who get off lightly, or are not in prison long enough or for 
the length of their sentence41 … [3] The system is so muddled that the public do not always  
understand it (Home Office, 2002, p. 86). 
 
          This is a kind of polemical language usually considered inappropriate in a serious policy 
document (Tonry, 2004). Nowhere does the White Paper give evidence of a public confused by 
sentencing outcomes. Sentencing procedures and outcomes are similar across many Western 
jurisdictions and if the UK’s doesn’t make sense then neither do theirs. Second, it is a matter of 
legal or governmental power, or of democratically expressed solidarity, whether or not a sentence 
is appropriate. It is not a self-positing standard that somehow manifests itself out of the ether. 
What is happening here is that the writer of the White Paper (the government of the day, loosely) 
is attempting to speak to a putative class, “The Public”, whose collective interests it believes it is 
capable of addressing and mobilizing through a fabricated resentment of a notional free-riding 
criminal class, which resentment it is culpable in generating by such rhetoric.  
          Where resentment is based on a perceived economic slight, we might suggest that Weber’s 
(1978 [1905]) ‘Protestant Ethic’ has some traction in making sense of the situation. Albeit that 
rather than the protestant nature of the work ethic translating economic slight into a religious 
one, the economic slight also translates into a slight against a collective belief in hard work, or, 
again, a resentment against pecuniary free riders on a system of supposed reciprocative benefit 
and subscription. As Jeffrie Murphy puts it “ …resented wrongs can be of two sorts: resentment of 
direct violations of one’s rights (as in assault) or resentment that another has taken unfair 
advantage of one’s sacrifices by free riding” (1998 [1982], p. 16). Where punitiveness as 
resentment is concerned, we might profitably look at Elias’ (2012 [1939]) civilizing process. I do 
not mean by this that I subscribe to Freud’s account of the development of the super-ego (I do 
 
40 G. F. Le Trosne Mémoire Sur les Vagabonds et sur les Mendiants. Paris 1764. 
41 That is, they are allowed out on parole too soon. 
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not) but I do mean to appeal to collective sensibilities concerning ‘civilized’ behaviour. Elias’ 
account reveals to us that what we might call ‘civilizing work’ is done by the collective. In this 
view, then, those who behave in an ‘uncivilized’ way may be seen as free-riders on a culturally 
advanced, beneficial society in which we may all be expected to take an active part equally to 
secure. An important issue here is that ‘uncivilized’ behaviour must not be confused with criminal 
behaviour. For example, young men parading around town, drunk, and without their shirts, 
promote negative reactive attitudes like resentment but such resentment is not a reaction to 
behaviour that is against the law, nor against one as an individual, but it is perceived as 
‘uncivilized’. It is seen as free-riding because, it is perceived that such young men should be at 
work, (Weber), and that they should contribute to the decorous nature of social living by keeping 
their shirts on, (Elias). In other words, sharing in the ‘civilizing work’ expected of everybody. The 
view often expressed is that these lads should be locked up – ‘given a short sharp shock with a 
night in the cells’: in other words, punished. Similarly, we hear, benefit recipients who don’t 
dispose properly of rubbish from their front gardens should have their benefits stopped. English 
politicians have recently stated that benefit claimants should not be given money to feed their 
children during school holidays because they will simply spend the money in crack dens (Murphy, 
2020). These attitudes are not driven by law breaking, but they do call for the infliction of pain for 
this behaviour or that, and they are not targeted against the acts of individuals, but of one class 
or another. That is, they represent a desire to punish, regardless of the content of the law. This is 
very similar to the desire to inflict pain upon those on remand despite the remandee not having 
been convicted of any crime42. Punitiveness is not directed against criminals necessarily, it is not 
directed necessarily against a criminal class, but it is directed against a xenos (ξένος), a class of 
others, generated jointly by those who make the law (and hence, who make criminals), and the 
general public. 
          A significant point in our discussion of punitiveness is that the reader may say that my 
discussion of resentment – should I persist in separating punitiveness, and the kind of 
resentment engendered by cultural and economic slight – is not a discussion of punitiveness. 
The point is this, that punitiveness is not always about crime, and it is not always about 
punishment as conventionally conceived. But it is always about a desire for punishment reduced 
to the delivery of pain, whether for criminal activity or not, and much of that kind of desire we call 
resentment, and it is as we have seen, manipulable and in addition it is contagious. 
Contagion: Penality and culture 
We have seen above, how resentment can be manipulated. Considering what I have just said, it 
is apposite that we now address the phenomenon of contagion. Towards the end of his book 
‘Punishment and Modern Society’, Garland (1990) moves to an examination of the relationship 
between punishment and culture. This is surely a necessary move. He is keen to point out, 
correctly, I think, that the relationship between punishment and culture is a two-way street, as I 
maintained  above. Punitive attitudes are not only a reflection of cultural values, but also an 
inculcator of them. However, he is wrong, I believe, on two counts. He appears to take culture or 
cultures to be entities: that is, he reifies them, and imbues them with a stability, ipseity, and 
hæcceity they do not possess. Moreover, he takes punishment to be communicative in a way that 
I have suggested it probably is not. Let us unpack this a little; Garland’s language is instructive 
here. His aim, he says, is to “indicate just how penal practices contribute to the making of the 
larger culture …” (p. 250 my emphases). This is of interest because it appears to me to evince a 
degree of functionalist thought, where functionalism is the doctrine that what makes something 
what it is dependent upon its function, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. 
These ‘somethings’ in Garland’s language are “larger culture” and “penal practices”, and they 
are characterised by their properties43 rather than by their capacities: that is, their supposed 
actual function in shaping one, criminal justice institutions, and two, cultural manifestations. The 
 
42 See the discussion of Garland’s (2018) above. 
43 See DeLanda (2006) and (Crewe, 2013). 
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word “making” indicates a kind of mechanical image of causation, in which, paradoxically, 
elsewhere in the chapter, he pejoratively accuses social sciences of persisting. In yet more 
mechanistically functionalist language, he says that he is keen to show that “culture [is] a 
determinant of punishment” (p. 249 my emphasis again). This reveals to my mind, a somewhat 
impoverished view, on Garland’s part, of the interrelationship of capacities and processes in the 
social world: that is, a world which is characterized by relations of exteriority, not relations of 
interiority. In a world characterized by relations of exteriority, culture is a set if processes leading 
to, or an emergent property manifested from, the interplay of the capacities of those processes. 
These processes (which are really cultural processes) are the processes by which we negotiate 
the (merely) pragmatic meaning to be attached to symbols, so that that meaning can be more or 
less shared and used to communicate about something or other in its absence. When we do this, 
we belong to a collective that shares that particular pragmatically ‘agreed’ meaning. This 
collective, to my mind, is what we call a culture, and it is highly fluid: indeed, it is never stable. 
Counterintuitively, in reality, it may have an infinitesimal degree of durability (Crewe, 2010). What 
is durable, though, is the nature of the processes of generating the feelings of belonging 
involved; its manifestations are not. Moreover, reification of ‘culture’ gives rise to locutions like 
‘gang culture’, ‘knife culture’, or ‘grooming culture’44, for example, which so often contain 
connotations of ‘race’45, the upshot of which is to mystify and misdirect with regard to the real 
problems of racism, for example. It is worthy of note that we rarely see reference to ‘greed 
culture’ or ‘drunk culture’ or ‘libertarian culture’ or ‘misogynistic culture’ or homophobic culture’ 
or ‘racist culture’ since these might be our guiding values. Where the term culture is used as a 
tool of misdirection and mystification, it has become a term that merely means different: but it 
means it in a pejorative way, and that means that it can be used to inculcate resentment and 
fear. 
          Garland’s second error, I believe, lies in his notion of what he takes to be the 
communicative nature of punitive action. As I have mentioned above, this idea has a long 
history46. “Punishment among other things, is a communicative and didactic institution” Garland 
(1990) says “Through the media of its practices and declarations it puts into effect – and into 
cultural circulation – some of the categories and distinctions through which we give meaning to 
the world” (p. 251). This, I think is a very bold claim. As I have already made clear, it seems to me 
that the evidence suggests that punishment does not communicate. People do not seem to be 
communicated to by instances of specific acts of punishment which must be what Garland 
means by the “practices” of punishment, not least because people in general are not interested 
in them, or at least, not until their sensibilities are stirred by media coverage, let’s say, of a 
particular crime, or of a particularly newsworthy sentence. What they are stirred by is the 
perception of a threat to their membership of a group, or to the persistence or the identity of the 
group, or to their ‘entitlements’, not so much the particulars of any individual sentence. The 
evidence, concerning deterrence mentioned above indicates that people are not used to thinking 
‘I would probably only get X months inside for a first-time burglary’, or ‘I might get X years since 
I’ve been done one already’, that is, Wilson’s ‘calculators’ (1985). Yet Garland now suggests that 
the communicative and didactic nature of punishment is affected by punishment’s 
“declarations”. To support this claim, he makes an appeal to Searle’s (1969 inter alia) and 
Austin’s (1975 [1969]) speech act theories (although he credits neither Searle nor Austin with 
the notion of illocutionary acts). Judges, he supposes, are in the business of ‘teaching a lesson’ 
to offenders by their “terse, plain-speaking words of condemnation”. In other words, by 
 
44 See Crewe (2016)  
45 ‘Race’ is, of course, in part, also a reified concept. That is, I take it that there is no real biological 
phenomenon, ‘race’. However, I recognize that the perception of race is a phenomenon with real social 
force, a Durkheimian ‘social fact’, perhaps.  
46 See Duff (2003). 
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performing excertives47, in Austin’s terminology. But the real question is ‘what do these speech 
acts actually do?’ A common example given of a speech act is the phrase ‘I now pronounce you 
husband and wife’. It is often said that this speech act ‘marries’ two people, never the less, that 
is not the case. This speech act pronounces that the marrying has taken place by virtue of the 
witnessed exchange of vows, the making of promises. This is what does the marrying. The 
supervisor of the ceremony is that witness, he declares that he has witnessed it. What then does 
the judge’s “terse” language do? If it communicates at all, it communicates to an audience, an 
audience that consists, according to Garland, of the offender, and following that the population of 
inmates to whom the offender later communicates. Also witness to this performance are court 
reporters and other interested parties, eventually reaching what Garland calls ‘the general 
public’. What it communicates is the sentence. This is, however, not the punishment itself, nor 
does it actually involve itself in the pragmatic negotiations that are involved with establishing 
cultural meanings, it is a declaration that is not open to negotiation; it merely announces the line 
taken by the law-making class on the offence committed. As Garland (1990) puts it “[t]hese 
institutions tacitly hold out their own practices as models or exemplars, showing how conduct 
and persons are to be held to account, by whom and on which terms” (p. 265). The actual 
audience envisioned here by Garland is not the “larger culture” that he refers to earlier in the 
chapter, and, if that “larger culture” has not been communicated to, they cannot use the 
communication as part of their meaning-negotiating processes. This ‘top down’ model, to my 
mind at least, is just not the way cultural communication works; we do not take our cultural 
‘instructions’ from our ‘betters’ in the manner of a schoolchild from a patrician master. We 
negotiate them. 
          There is, however, a way that punitiveness is involved in cultural formation, and it has to do 
with belonging, as I have already suggested above. The origin of the suggestion I wish to advance 
here is the understanding that our symbols are elastic. This elasticity is necessarily so because of 
(the doctrine known as) privileged access: that is, (the conviction) that the only states of mind 
about which we can have any certainty are our own. In this circumstance, in order to 
communicate, we have to agree to agree that our grasp of another’s states of mind, is, 
pragmatically, close enough. This is what I mean when I say that we share meanings. When we 
share meanings, we feel that we belong to the group, class, culture, that shares these meanings. 
One of the things that is of importance to this paper is that amongst other things, we share our 
resentments. We may imagine, for example, two people in the country club, or golf club; one says 
to the other ‘doesn’t it just rile you when …?’ The answer may be perfectly straight forward ‘Oh 
yeah – dreadful’. ‘Yeah’ they chime, ‘We should lock them up.’ They both drink from their scotch 
and Club Soda. What has just happened here is that the second speaker has given what is called 
the ‘preferred answer’48: they have agreed to agree. Imagine, however, that the resentment 
harboured by the first speaker was of people of colour, and the second speaker was you. You 
have three options; to give the preferred answer because you agree with the first speaker, to give 
the preferred answer despite disagreeing with the first speaker, which will make you feel 
uncomfortable, or you can give the ‘dispreferred’ answer which will mean a degree of 
discomfiture from the challenge to your self-confidence, and that the first speaker will not 
consider you a member of ‘their’ club. You take your drink elsewhere. A question then arises. If 
you take your drink elsewhere to share with someone else, will you find the same resentments 
expressed? If you do, you will not join the club. You may, however, suppress your own concern 
about the dominant culture of racism in the club because you are desperate to ingratiate yourself 
with your neighbours, for example; you are desperate to become a member of your local country 
club (or working men’s club). This is an indication of how resentments, attitudes etc., intensify in 
 
47 in which speakers exercise powers, rights or influence, e.g. excommunicating and resigning etc. 
48 See for example Harvey Sacks’ (1987 [1973]) On the Preferences for Agreement and Contiguity in 
Sequences in Conversation, or his (1974) A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn-Taking for 
Conversation, with Shegloff and Jefferson, in their work on conversation analysis and in particular, 
adjacency pairs. 
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social (cultural) situations. The desire to inflict harm on those whom one resents becomes 
amplified through the mechanisms of sharing meanings and attitudes in the social (cultural) 
setting. However, should you decline membership of the club on these grounds, your sensibilities 
will not become the defining cultural feature of that club, or whatever meaning-sharing group we 
care to think of. Please forgive me for this highly crude example. Nonetheless, these 
memberships (of any kind of meaning-sharing group, even as small as two people, and stretching 
to what we might call a national culture) are the vehicle for the intensification and reinforcement 
of cultural attitudes like resentment and the concomitant desires to inflict harm. Similar 
processes of negotiating preferred and dispreferred speech, behaviour, or meanings are at work 
in far more subtle ways across all modes and scales of interaction (Sacks, 1987 [1973] et 
passim; Sacks et al., 1974). 
          A major problem with this kind of communication has become considerably more 
significant recently. In part one of this paper, I suggested that the retreat of penal sanction from 
public view has served to reduce our sympathies with the victims of penal practices. It has been 
suggested that we have moved into a ‘post truth era’. For example, in the US you may watch Fox 
News and consequently believe that your country is being over-run by people from Mexico who 
are all murderers, rapists, and economic free-riders. Our resentments appear to be more and 
more open to suggestion, and the inculcation of division by those with the power to control the 
media. Our resentments, in consequence lose their connection to any real slight or harm and 
become more and more attached to groups of Others whose othering serves as a tool of 
governance. Our response is then, fuelled by our resentment, to wish those others harm. 
 
Conclusion: Punitiveness, responsibility, resentment, and liberty. 
I am always interested when an idea seems to suggest of itself that its meaning is obvious, and 
this has been true for me for a very long time where the notion of popular punitiveness is 
concerned. How and why is this phenomenon so established (if indeed it is) and so widespread. 
One might assume that the commonplace view of what punitiveness is, is the desire to inflict 
punishment on offenders. The question begged by this notion is ‘what is punishment?’ If we knew 
the answer to this question, the question ‘what is punitiveness?’ would be a relatively 
straightforward one. I have suggested that, in reality, this is a long way from the truth. It appears 
that only one of the conventionally accepted definitions, or conditions for something to be 
considered punishment is without serious problems and that one, following Christie (1981) is 
that it is the infliction of pain, or harm. Hence, punitiveness would be the desire to inflict harm. 
We discover a further problem however when we assume that the harm should be inflicted on 
offenders; what do we mean by offenders? I suggested that the evidence indicates that offenders 
legally defined are not the only group upon which we wish to exact punitive harm.  
          An examination of the emotional foundations of popular punitiveness appears to show that 
it is a cultural affect: it is emergent from cultural processes. It operates via shared resentments 
or supposed shared resentments that serve to, establish, secure, and identify belonging to a 
particular group or class. It is also a part of the hegemonic processes of the governing classes, 
particularly evident at the moment where ‘woke’ ideas, for example appear to threaten the 
‘entitlement’ of those classes, and hence, inculcate in them a resentment of so called ‘liberal 
elites’. As I have pointed out above, resentment is conventionally taken to be an individual 
phenomenon. This is readily visible when one has been assaulted or burgled for example, or 
when one has been snubbed by one’s boss, but resentment may manifest itself as a combination 
of individual and collective phenomena. For example, we have seen that I (as an individual) can 
resent a class of people that I perceive to be free riders. In the UK a perennial example of this 
kind of effect is the resentment of benefit recipients, or particularly currently, asylum seekers. 
The United States, at the moment, for example, appears to display a four-tier structure of 
resentment. Coastal liberals resent the chauvinism represented by the ‘republican’ upper classes 
and the extreme inequality that their economic behaviour brings about. These ’republicans’ 
resent the liberals’ attempts to hamper their perceived entitlement to continue in this vein: their 
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liberty so to do. Through acts of misdirection, a class of neglected blue collar and working-class 
people, is caused to resent a putative, parasitic underclass whom they are encouraged to believe 
are free riding on their hard work, in addition to the liberal coastal class who are said to 
encourage this free riding, killing two political birds with one stone. 
          When one, or one’s relationships, are parasitized upon by the free rider, the effect is to 
send a message that the victim is of diminished worth, or in Kantian terms, not fully a person 
who is an end in their own right: one of diminished rank. In Levinasian terms, the parasite fails to 
respect the true ‘height’ (Levinas, 1998) of the Other who precedes him. This is, in part, the 
nature of the slight given by the free rider. However, there is, of course, in Levinas, a concomitant 
failure on my part as the free-ridden-upon: the resenter. My resentment of the free rider 
represents a failure on my part to accord to the free rider the ‘height’ due to them as a subject in 
their own right, who is given over to my responsibility (Levinas, 1981): a subject whose own 
subjectivity precedes my apprehension of him. In plain terms, I, as the resenter, fail to 
understand the circumstance of my victimizer, to place myself in their shoes, as it were. I have 
failed to exercise my responsibility towards my victimizer49. Were this to be brought to many 
people’s attention they would probably say that the claimant of benefits or seeker of asylum 
should take responsibility for themselves. In this response, surely, is revealed an antinomy 
between responsibility and liberty when liberty is thought of as freedom from constraint: that is, 
Berlin’s (1969) negative freedom. My desire for liberty, then, foments resentment of those who 
would restrict it, and resentment foments the desire to inflict harm: that is, punitiveness. Our 
view of our own liberty is always skewed, we almost always perceive it to be under attack, that 
there is someone ‘taking liberties’ as we say. There should, in Levinasian terms, exist an 
inequality that means all responsibility is mine. In reality, it is a more common belief that all 
liberty is mine. And we appear to have a great propensity to resent anyone who looks like 
impeding those liberties. 
          Our liberties can be constituted of all manner of things, after all, complete liberty in Berlin’s 
negative liberty terms means being free to do whatever we might want. Hence, if I wish to work at 
fruit picking and wish to be paid a certain wage for that work, I will resent the person who is 
prepared to do that work for less. I can be sensitized to feeling this way for political purposes, 
particularly if those workers can be perceived as a distinct group. This kind of resentment is a 
pernicious durable experience, not a brief disturbance or moment which one readily gets over (as 
in the standard account of resentment to be found in Murphy and others). On the other side of 
the coin, the patrician who is used to having many such people work for them on these poverty 
wages will be resentful should a minimum wage be established, which would serve to restrict 
their freedom to exploit their workers, and hence their freedom to live the wealthy lifestyle to 
which they have become accustomed, that is, to threaten their feeling of entitlement to these 
things. The point is that the real exploiters here are not the poor seeking work, but the wealthy 
libertarians paying dirt wages. I noted at the very beginning of my introduction that the target of 
resentment does not have to be real. This makes the task of the manipulation of resentments 
more readily achievable. The target of the poor’s resentment of those in greater need than them 
has been manipulated by rhetorical misdirection and mystification, and this is a highly 
commonplace political tactic of the patrician class. 
          As a result of this mystification however, rather than bottom up as in Nietzsche, punitive 
resentment appears to work top down, particularly at the lower levels of society (for want of a 
better term). Those policing the BLM protests with ‘less lethal’ weapons, surely resent the 
protestors. They appear to resent the resentment of the status quo that the protesters represent, 
and which status quo serves their lifestyle and family life, not just through the provision of a wage 
but through membership of well documented police culture. Their response to the protest is 
punitive. We should note, however, that my freedom is always at the cost of the freedom of 
someone else. My choice of action always serves to restrict the choice of another. This is true at 
an extremely banal level. I buy the last pack of cheap bacon in the store; someone less well off 
 
49 See Crewe, (2019). 
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than I has to pay more for their bacon. However, the notion that ‘my’ freedom over-rides my 
responsibility to Others is one of the most pervasive, and indeed pernicious, views in the West, 
and indeed it should be noted that almost universally it persists, politically, at higher levels, along 
with heightened levels of inequality, in those states with the most pronounced levels of 
punitiveness. As Downes and Hansen (2006) put it: 
simply, we find that countries that spend a greater proportion of GDP on welfare have lower 
imprisonment rates and that this relationship has become stronger over the last 15 years. 
The consistency in these findings across the United States and the other 17 countries 
studied makes it difficult to believe that this relationship is simply accidental or 
coincidental (p. 1). 
          Punitiveness, then is a pernicious kind of resentment, or even resentment, that is not 
necessarily related to legal wrongs or law-breaking. It appears that the frustrated, future-oriented 
nature of desire or will to correct a perceived slight, permits the resentment to fester, such that it 
evolves into a desire that the precipitators of that resentment are caused to or permitted to suffer 
harm: these harms constitute punishment and the desire to inflict is what we call punitiveness. I 
claimed, however in part one of this paper that punishment merely reduces to the infliction of pain. 
In this circumstance it becomes reasonable to speak of punitive resentment that is not bound by 
juridic considerations. Freed from this illegitimate constraint, the desire to inflict punitive harm in 
response to many kinds of slight becomes evident. A large number of these perceived slights 
involve the supposed apprehension of free riders and these, often, are free riders on my liberty. 
My liberty to pay low taxes is curtailed by the imperative for me to be responsible for the other in 
need. For example, I may resent refugees coming to the country and causing my taxes to rise to 
pay for their health care. Expressly in the United States, many resent those reliant on Obamacare 
because they feel it raises their insurance costs. They wish harm on those people because they 
effectively say ‘let them suffer, they should take responsibility for themselves’. My liberty to be paid 
a reasonable wage for my work is curtailed by those prepared to work for less than I. My reaction 
towards them is punitive, I wish them harm when I desire to send them back to their country of 
origin where they may well experience abject poverty. ‘Well’, I may say, ‘they should look after 
themselves’. These attitudes are punitive. This is popular punitiveness at work. It is not a 
necessary, not completely natural, nor an inevitable part of the solution of social problems, and 
accordingly we must conclude that it is eradicable. Hence, let me return (almost) to the Golfing 
translation of Nietzsche (1956, p. 204 my emphsis). “It is possible to imagine a society flushed 
with such a sense of [mercy, and responsibility for others DJC] that it could afford to let its offenders 
go unpunished. What greater luxury is there for a society to indulge in”. We would also like to be 
able to say, where criminals conventionally conceived are concerned, ‘come back into the house 
where it is warm, and we can care for you’. Unfortunately, currently the house is not warm, all the 
heat has been purloined by the people living in the penthouse apartment, and those downstairs 
are left fighting over which of the people living in the basement they most resent for leaving the 
door to the apartment open. 
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